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Abstract
This experiment attempts to determine whether procedural 
learning in a finite state grammar task is driven by 
evocative conscious contents (Dulany, 1984, 1991) or 
unconscious implicit procerses (Lewicki, Hill, Bizot, 
1988; Peber, 1989). The experimental task is a novel 
adaptation of the typical finite state grammar experiment 
in its attempts to compel subjects to achieve automatized 
responses through a discrimination learning procedure. 
The results demonstrate the achievement of procedural 
learning, and an assessment of subjects' awareness of 
grammatical rules is used to determine that evocative 
conscious contents provide the most defensible 
interpretation of the learning effects of the task. This 
is demonstrated through the prediction of the proportion 
of correct responses by the subjects' reported rule 
validities, and an alternative characterization of 
implicit learning is supported.
The role of consciousness in scientific psychology 
has often been dubious and unstable. Host recently, this 
can be seen in the research on action, memory, and 
learning (Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984? Klatzky, 1984; 
Reber, 1989). A new controversy has emerged in cognitive 
psychology which focuses upon some of the fundamental 
claims of the field. This controversy is based on the 
phenomenon of unconscious, or implicit, processes in 
learning, memory, and action,
In the recent research literature, these unconscious 
processes are collectively described as the "cognitive 
unconscious" (Kihlstrom, 1987). Some cognitive 
psychologists have found this notion to be questionable, 
both in theory and in practice (Dulany, 1984/ Holender, 
1986). The fundamental claims of the early cognitive 
revolution are now facing new challenges. From the use 
of the computer as a metaphor for the mind, to the 
information processing view of the mind, the claims of 
early cognitive science are being questioned. Yet the 
fundamental claim that is most important for this 
controversy of implicit processes is that of nonconscious 
symbolic representation. It is in the context of 
symbolic or semantic representation that the claim for 
nonconscious processes must be considered. Few
psychologists would claim that there are no processes 
which take place in the mind that are inaccessible to 
conscious thought. For example, all concede that the 
process which yields depth perception in vision will not 
be found in consciousness. No one introspectively knows 
the perceptual mechanisms of the mind. Yet the 
controversy at hand concerns the notion of semantic, 
meaningful, and symbolic processes taking place 
unconsciously.
In the implicit learning literature, all of the 
experiments follow a certain format. There are four 
experimental paradigms that investigate the existence of 
implicit learning; these experimental techniques are the 
systems (Berry, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Dulany & 
Wilson, 1990; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988;), covariation 
(Dulany & Poldrack, 1991; Lewicki, 1986a), sequence 
(Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; 
Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy, 1990), and finite state 
grammar paradigms (Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1990; 
Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 
1990; Reber, 1976, 1989). Each of these four paradigms 
consists of a task that is a priori considered to have a 
learning situation with underlying contingencies which 
are more complex than the subject is capable of
consciously learning. Yet the results of many of these 
experiments show that the subjects learn how to perform 
the experimental task better than do controls. The 
controversy consists in the interpretations of the 
experimental findings, where there are two main 
theoretical characterizations of the various experiments. 
The first view, which is most common, interprets the 
results of these experiments to be due to learning tacit 
(unconscious) knowledge of the experiment's 
contingencies, since it is often found that the subjects 
are unable to verbalize what was presumably learned (a 
rule or contingency the experimenter used in designing 
the task). The second view proposes that the evidence is 
either inconclusive on whether the material was 
unconsciously represented, or that it shows that what was 
learned was in conscious awareness when it controlled 
performance of the task. On this view, the fact that the 
subjects were unable to verbalize the actual underlying 
contingencies of the stimulus domain is irrelevant. The 
learning effects can be explained by conscious rules of 
the subjects which only approximate the actual 
contingencies, yet the application of these rules could 
be responsible for the effect of learning. This contrast 
between a theory of a "cognitive unconscious" and a
theory of conscious learning is what constitutes this 
controversy.
An Experimental Earadiom
The finite state grammar paradigm will be the focus 
of the present experimental investigation. The original 
studies that opened the controversy of unconscious 
implicit learning were examples of this paradigm, and 
their findings have focussed upon three main issues. The 
first deals with evidence for and against two separate 
modes of learning (the implicit and explicit). The 
second concerns the form of the representation of the 
acquired knowledge. The third ana last issue is based on 
the awareness of what is learned, with a special emphasis 
on the methodology of the assessment.
As we begin, it will be useful to explain the 
general task used in the finite state grammar studies. A 
complex stimulus is presented to the subjects, where the 
stimulus is a string of letters (e.g. QXQT) which is 
formed through the use of a finite state grammar. The 
subjects are presented several letter strings that
Insert Figure 1 about here
are made from this grammar and are instructed to remember
8as much about the letter strings as possible. This 
constitutes the learning phase of the experiment. The 
test phase follows by having the subjects judge whether a 
string is grammatical or not. They are presented with an 
equal number of grammatical and non-grammatical letter 
strings (some of which were not seen in the learning 
phase), and respond either ye§ or as to the 
grammatical status of the strings. Usually the non- 
grammatical strings are made by violating one of the 
positions of the grammar (e.g, VXVH). If the subjects 
are able to categorize these strings with accuracy above 
chance, then they have learned the grammar to some 
degree. After or during the test phase, some measurement 
is taken of the subjects' awareness of the grammar. The 
measurements that are used to tap into conscious 
awareness will be one of the major issues addressed in 
this paper. Now that the general experiment has been 
described, the first item of interest in this research 
concerns the evidence for two modes of learning.
The argument for two separate modes of learning, the 
explicit and the implicit, is based on evidence from two 
experimental manipulations. First, as we have seen, 
studies have focussed on the degree to which subjects are 
aware of the grammar. Secondly, experiments have
attempted to determine if the type of instructions given 
to the subjects will have an effect on the learning of 
the grammar. For example, they are usually altered so 
that one group will receive instructions based on 
memorization, while the other group's instructions are 
based on the learning of rules. The memory instructions 
tell the subjects simply to memorize the letter strings 
during the learning phase. The learning-based set 
informs the subjects that there is a rule underlying the 
strings and that it will help them to learn it. In 
general, this difference in instructional set is labeled 
as implicit: and explicit. The memorization set gives no 
information that there is a pattern to the strings, while 
the rule learning set explicitly mentions the presence of 
underlying rules. Some researchers have asked that this 
distinction be known as incidental versus intentional 
instructions, since it is an empirical issue whether the 
incidental instructions will ensure implicit learning 
(Perruchet & Pacteau, 1991). However, the manipulation 
of instructional set has been empirically investigated to 
determine if there is an effect on the learning of the 
grammar. The findings have been in favor of no effect on 
the amount of learning? the performances of the two 
groups at test were equal (Dienes et al., 1990? Dulany et
9
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al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; but see Reber, 1976 
for dissent). Yet, it has been considered by some 
researchers that a result of no effect means that the 
explicit (or intentional) instructions did not help the 
subjects in learning the grammar (Matthews, Buss,
Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989) . This 
interpretation seems to have developed from the earlier 
findings of Reber (1976) where the explicit instructions 
hindered the learning of the grammar. Perruchet and 
Pacteau (1991) have criticized this bias in 
interpretation and have stated that the absence of an 
effect could be explained by the subjects' conscious use 
of rules when in the implicit instruction group. They 
argue it is natural for the implicit group to use rules 
to try to memorize the letter strings. Thus, the 
evidence in regard to the instructional set seems to 
point toward a single mode of learning, rather than 
separate explicit and implicit modes.
Still another manipulation attempts to determine if 
there are, in fact, two modes of learning; the addition 
of a secondary task. Dienes et al. (1990) used a random 
number generation task during the learning phase of the 
grammar task to ascertain if an implicitly instructed 
group would perform differently than the explicitly
instructed group. An earlier finding had shown that 
there was a selective impairment of performance on a 
systems task for the dual-task/explicit instruction group 
{Hayes, 1987). This was considered as evidence for two 
learning modes. However, Dienes et al. (1990) found that 
there was an equal impairment of performance and verbal 
report on the grammar task for both the implicit and 
explicit instruction groups. This finding demonstrates 
that the amount of learning for both groups was affected 
equally by the secondary task (i.e. to generate random 
numbers). This is further support for a single mode of 
learning, since the secondary task did not dissociate the 
groups by changes in performance on the grammar 
classification task nor by changes in performance of the 
random number generation task (the secondary task) .
The proposal of an implicit and explicit mode of 
learning has been challenged on two accounts. Both the 
instructional set and dual task manipulations failed to 
demonstrate a difference in the amount of learning. Due 
to several sources of criticism, the distinction between 
an implicit and explicit mode of learning is becoming 
less plausible. The only remaining dissociation between 
the two modes concerns the issue of awareness. Before 
considering the controversy over that topic, the
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representation of the knowledge that is learned in the 
grammar task will be examined.
This question of representation is a major topic in 
this paradigm. There are three main views as to the form 
of the subjects' knowledge of the grammar. That the 
subjects have some knowledge of the grammar, or of that 
which overlaps the grammar, is an uncontested finding in 
the literature. The learning >s demonstrated by the 
above-chance performance of the subjects when judging 
grammaticality of novel letter strings (Dulany et al., 
1984; Reber, 1976). Yet there are different 
interpretations as to what the knowledge is, what it is 
knowledge at, and what form it takes. Reber (1976, 1989) 
has claimed that the knowledge from the grammar task is 
an abstraction of the grammatical rules. However, it has 
been implied by other researchers that the knowledge may 
consist of specific exemplars in memory (Matthews et al., 
1989) . Currently, the issue is not exactly clear. The 
problem seems to lie in that the issue of representation 
becomes muddled with the i ssue of awareness, and both of 
the previously mentioned groups of researchers defend the 
existence of unconscious implicit learning. Others, such 
as Dulany et al. (1984) and Perruchet and Pacteau (1911), 
hold a view that the knowledge learned in the task is of
12
an abstracted nature, yet they contend that the 
abstraction results in consciously represented knowledge. 
This is quite antithetical to the view of Reber (1989), 
where the abstraction process is held to yield an 
unconscious and inaccessible knowledge. Moreover, this 
leads to the final topic of this paradigm, the 
controversy over awareness.
The issue of awareness is inextricably linked to the 
problem of how to assess it. In the grammar paradigm, 
this is a fundamental problem. There are two main views 
on whether the subjects are consciously aware of rules 
that describe a grammar (the rules which they are 
learning). And these two views can be separated 
according to the methods that are considered to be valid 
when measuring the subjects' awareness of the rules.
Those researchers who claim that the subjects are unaware 
of rules rely upon free recall measures (Reber & Lewis, 
1977). (Although in an earlier study, it was simply 
assumed that the stimulus is too complex for the subjects 
to learn anything explicitly (Reber, 1976).) On the 
other side of the theoretical fence, those researchers 
who claim that the subjects are aware of the rules rely 
upon recognition measures (Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet 
& Pacteau, 1990) . There has been considerable discussion
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over which methodology is appropriate to measure 
conscious awareness. In particular, Brody (1989) has 
noted that a forced-choice recognition assessment is most 
appropriate. He argues that one must be sure that the 
assessment adequately exhausts the subject's conscious 
knowledge of the rules. In the case of Reber and Lewis 
(1977), the measure used to assess awareness was a verbal 
report, wherein the subjects were told to give reasons 
and justifications for the judgments they had made at 
test. Since none of the r; objects mentioned anything like 
the actual rules of the grammar, the results of the 
learning were interpreted as being due to a base of 
implicit knowledge. However, in the case of Dulany et 
al. (1984) and Perruchet and Pacteau (1990), the measure 
of awareness was based on recognition. In Dulany et al. 
(1984), the subjects were instructed to write down what 
part of the letter string made that string grammatical or 
non-grammatical. These rules were then analyzed for 
validity values, which are their correlations with the 
actual finite state grammar. Dulany et al. (1984) had 
been open to the possibility that the subjects' knowledge 
of the grammar may not correspond exactly to the finite 
state grammar, especially when the amount of learning was 
imperfect. The results of Dulany et al. (1984) showed
14
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that the subjects' rule validities predicted their amount 
of learning. Similarly, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) 
claimed that the learning that takes place in the grammar 
task can be explained by conscious, fragmentary knowledge 
of the letter strings. Their experiment showed that 
subjects given only fragments of strings during the 
learning phase (e.g. QX, TM) were able to perform as well 
as those who had been given the entire string. 
Furthermore, a forced-recognition assessment of these 
fragments was able to account for the amount of learning 
demonstrated by their performance. The authors interpret 
this as evidence for conscious rules explaining the 
amount of learning.
The Dulany et al. (1984) study was criticized by 
Reber, Allen, and Regan (1985). Reber and his colleagues 
were concerned that the Dulany study was compromised by 
demand characteristics. They contended that the 
knowledge represented by the rule validities may be 
reconstructions or post-hoc justifications (e.g. 
guessing) for the earlier, implicit judgments about the 
grammar. In reply to these criticisms, Dulany, Carlson, 
and Dewey (1985) defended their measure of awareness.
They asserted that the critical feature for the 
assessment was that it took place at the moment of
judgment (during the test phase). Since all of these 
reports are remembrances of some judgment process, it is 
most important to assess the subjects' conscious contents 
at the time of judgment, otherwise there will be a 
decline in the validity of the report. Thus, Dulany et 
al. point to the fact that an immediate assessment is the 
only defensible measure to use. Moreover, as a further 
defense of the measure, they reaffirm that the data for 
the rule validities predict the subjects' performance, 
and that computer simulation shows random guessing would 
account for the obtained data only once in ten billion 
occasions. This seems to argue against the criticism 
that the rules were guesses in response to demand 
characteristics. Moreover, Dulany et al. (1985) continue 
in the article to describe a meta-theoretical view of the 
learning process and its relation with consciousness.
This will be examined in the next section.
Throughout the experimental paradigms, the results 
of many of the studies imply that the view of implicit 
learning is slowly giving way to the view that supports 
conscious, fragmented learning. As better methods of 
assessing consciousness are being developed, the evidence 
for unconscious implicit learning is fading. There are 
still many issues of relevance in this domain, especially
16
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the matters of representation and automaticity. Now that 
the paradigms have been thoroughly examined, the next 
section will be a deeper exploration of a theory for 
conscious semantic representation.
Ihfi-.Paradi gma Lis..Con t ext
Across the different experimental paradigms, a 
common set of assumptions can be seen to underlie the 
experimental interpretations of the researchers who 
assert the existence of unconscious learning. These 
assumptions, as demonstrated in this introduction, are 
also common to the majority of cognitive psychologists. 
They are the fundamental claims of the science, and in 
the field of learning, they are active in the distinction 
between implicit and explicit learning. From many of the 
studies examined previously (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; 
Lewicki, 1986a; Lewicki et al., 1988; Reber, 1976), the 
implicit mode of learning is considered to be 
nonanalytic, unintentional, and unconscious. Conversely, 
the explicit learning mode is thought to be analytic, 
intentional, and conscious. Yet, according to the 
results of the challenging studies (Du'any et al., 1984; 
Dulany & Wilson, 1990; Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy, 1990; 
Dulany & Poldrack, 1991), the validity of these 
assumptions is questionable. In regard to these
18
theoretical and meta-theoretical issues, a detailed and 
coherent alternative view has been offered (Dulany, 1984, 
1991) .
Dulany (1984, 1991) criticizes the standard view of 
consciousness on two points. The first claims that a 
major problem in this area is the lack of an analytic 
posture toward consciousness. The second point attacks 
the "separate systems assumption" which divides the mind 
into systems of conscious and unconscious processes. For 
the problem of consciousness, Dulany describes the 
concept through intentionality (cf. Searle, 1983). He 
defines consciousness as a state which consists of 
agency, mode, content, and aboutness. These are four 
dimensions of consciousness which will produce several 
variables for investigation, and every state lies at 
their intersection. Each conscious state is seen as a 
complex state, which in general will take the form of "I 
(agent) believe (mode) that Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
(content), and that content is about an event [i.e.
Caesar crossing the Rubicon]" (Dulany, 1984, p. 5).
Among these different aspects of a conscious state, the 
mode and the content are very important in regard to 
research on learning.
The mode is a varying type of mental state, such as
19
believing, hoping, or desiring. Whereas these modes are 
all considered to be propositional attitudes in the field 
of philosophy, Dulany wants to add another mode which is 
not propositional. His sub-propositional attitudes are 
used to make the distinction between the "perception &£ a 
blue cup and the propositional perception that the cup is 
blue" (p. 6). This is important for learning because 
this idea of propositional contents and sub-propositional 
contents grounds Dulany's alternative view of implicit 
and explicit learning (Dulany, 1991). This alternative 
view considers implicit learning in the context of 
automatic processes, which are thought to be too fast for 
conscious deliberation. In this case, the implicit 
process occurs when one hears a familiar song, and one 
knows the words before they come, without deliberatively 
conceiving the outcome. This is a sense of implicit that 
the earlier experiments (Hayes, 1987; Lewicki, 1986a; 
Lewicki et al., 1988; Reber, 1989) were thought to 
possess, yet the new research (Dulany & Poldrack, 1991; 
Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) seems to 
have shown that the learning taking place is deliberative 
(explicit). However, a crucial aspect of Dulany's 
characterization of implicit and explicit learning is 
that both processes consist of operations upon conscious
20
contents, with implicit having sub-propositional contents 
and explicit having propositional contents. Little 
research has been done to support this alternative view, 
and the work described in this paper is one of the first 
attempts to investigate this claim of an alternative type 
of implicit learning.
Furthermore, the theoretical importance of conscious 
contents applies directly to the experimental paradigms, 
specifically the problem with measures of awareness. As 
seen earlier, the empirical methods used by Dulany and 
his associates (1984; Dulany & Poldrack, 1991) to measure 
awareness were based on the subjects' conscious contents 
of the underlying rule. In the grammar paradigm, the 
sets of conscious contents were the “correlated grammars" 
(Dulany et al., 1984). D ilany (1984) defines the content 
as providing the subject, predicate, and specific 
propositional variables of the conscious state. Thus, 
through this detailed explication of consciousness,
Dulany outlines a view that can define several 
experimental variables in the investigation of 
consciousness.
In reply to the second criticism, the challenge to 
the “separate systems assumption", Dulany (1984) develops 
a systematic outline of mental episodes. Rather than
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adhering to the notion that conscious processes are 
unconnected to unconscious processes, the proposed view 
considers all mental episodes to consist of an operation 
working upon a content. The first point made here is 
that processes cannot be conscious, since consciousness 
is a mental state rather than an operation. This allows 
there to be four possible kinds of mental episodes.
These episodes differ in the status of the mental 
contents, where the contents are either conscious or 
unconscious. Dulany proposes that mental episodes only 
take the form of a conscious content altered by a 
nonconscious operation to produce a new conscious 
content. This challenges all “cognitive unconscious" 
theories, including those that claim the existence of 
unconscious learning.
Throughout the research of implicit learning, a new 
view has come to the forefront, and this view challenges 
the existence of unconscious learning. New formulations 
of the learning process are coming to prominence, and the 
emphasis centers upon the consciously deliberative. 
However the case may be that the controversy over 
implicit learning is changing to favor the conscious 
process view, there still remains the problem of 
investigating truly automatic processes and their
relation to the control of conscious contents. As 
mentioned earlier, this area of research is only now 
beginning, and it is here that we begin the report of our 
Investigation of the automatization of a finite state 
grammar task.
Procedural learning and automaticity in learning and 
action have been popularized by examples of complex 
skills, such as driving a car, which demonstrate the 
ease with which some complex tasks can eventually be 
performed, although the initial learning of the task was 
difficult and deliberate. On the standard interpretation 
of such learning and action phenomena, Schneider and 
Shiffrin (1977) have defined two types of information 
processing; controlled and automatic. Controlled 
processing (e.g. deliberative learning) is considered 
effortful, slow (relative to automatic processing), and 
serial. In contrast, automatic processing (e.g. implicit 
learning) is relatively effortless, fast, and parallel. 
The most important distinction for our purposes concerns 
the accessibility of the processing. The automatic 
process is "veiled" or unconscious, and the controlled 
process is primarily conscious (Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977, p. 147) . This has been the standard interpretation 
of automatized action, and the type of learning that
23
leads to this phenomenon is procedural learning.
The present experiment, a discrimination task, was 
designed to produce results of procedural learning which 
could be characterized as automatic responses within the 
constraint of a one hour session. The number of strings 
which were presented to the subjects was minimized in 
order to simplify the complexity of the task in hopes of 
reaching automaticity. A time limit, or deadline, for 
response was also minimized to a one second interval in 
order to compel fast learning and fast automatization. 
Achievement of learning the discrimination task should be 
demonstrated by the increasing percentage above chance of 
correct responses to the grammatical versus non- 
grammatical strings in a finite state grammar paradigm. 
The evidence for procedural learning (a foreshadowing of 
automaticity) should consist of a slowing of response 
with the introduction of a novel stimulus-- the standard 
cost criterion (i.e. the shift from old to novel 
strings). Also, due to the use of a constrained deadline 
for response time (1 sec), a significant increase hi the 
proportion of correct responses should suggest 
proceduralization. Since subjects are forced to respond 
very quickly, any significant increase in correct 
responses would suggest a trend away from deliberative
learning.
There are two criteria that would not be expected 
from this experimental design, and due to the widespread 
use of these criteria for procedural learning research, 
it is important to mention why they are not expected in 
this case. One is a continuous decrease and leveling off 
of response latency until the presentation of novel 
grammar strings. The second is the fit of the RT data by 
a power function, a commonly recognized criterion for 
automaticity (Logan, 1990) . If the experiment would 
allow subjects to respond within a larger time limit (2 
or 3 sec), then the RT data might conform to a gradual 
decrease over blocks, as well as being subject to fit by 
a power function, yet the deadline of a one second 
response precludes the expectation of a decrease of RT, 
which also entails the lack of fit by a power function.
The experiment would then test the claim of Dulany's 
alternative view of implicit learning by assessing the 
subjects' awareness of any rules (e.g. F 'MT' -> 
grammatical, meaning Feature 'MT' of string 'MTQ' evokes 
a sense of 'grammatical') and determining th« degree to 
which their validities correlate with correct 
classifications of the finite state grammar. If learning 
is manifest as awareness of a feature evoking a sense of
grammaticality, subjects should be able to recode that 
episode as a reportable rule of a similar form. The 
measurement of the validity of these reported rules is 
done through the use of VALSCORE, a program first used by 
Dulany et al. (1984). VALSCORE computes the probability 
that a reported feature will correspond to a grammatical 
classification of the finite state grammar. A 
correlational analysis is then needed to determine the 
predictability of the subject's task performance from the 
mean validity of the reported rules (features). If the 
validity of the subjects' "correlated rules" predicts 
their performance without significant residual, then it 
will show that even in cases of proceduralized learning, 
conscious contents correlated with the grammar are 
driving the performance of the classification response. 
This contrasts with claims that procedural learning and 
automatized responses are driven by unconscious, implicit 
semantic processes (Baars & Matson, 1981? Klatzky, 1984; 
Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot 1988; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987).
An example of such theorizing is found in a sequence task 
experiment of Lewicki, Hill, and Bizot (1988), "The 
results demonstrate that nonconsciously acquired 
knowledge can automatically be utilized to facilitate 
performance, without requiring conscious awareness or
25
control over this knowledge" (p. 24). In response to 
such claims, the present study attempts to demonstrate 
that automatized or procedural learning in a modified 
finite state grammar task is driven by CQassious contents 
of "correlated rules", where the presence of a 
grammatical string evokes the thought d  or a sense &£
"grammat i ca1i ty".
27
Method
Sukiesls
Subjects were 46 right-handed undergraduates at the 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. All 
participated as requirement for credit in an introductory 
psychology course. Right-handed subjects were chosen to 
ensure that response interaction with the computer 
keyboard would not interfere with response latency. (The 
positioning of the keys is most comfortable for right­
handers . )
D e s ig n
The experiment used a within-subjects design.
Factors were blocks, string length, and old/novel for the 
transfer block (11).
MaLsrials
Stimuli consisted of letter strings constructed from 
a finite state grammar (see Figure 1). Twenty-four 
strings were used, twelve of which were grammatical and 
twelve non-grammatical, The non-grammatical strings were 
constructed by impermissible substitutions of letters in 
grammatical strings. Each set of grammatical and non- 
grammatical strings was randomly divided into a training 
set (old strings) and novelty set (new strings). Each of 
these sets consisted of six grammatical and six non-
28
grammatical strings. The length of the string also 
varied from three, five, or seven letters. There were 
four strings o f  each length for both grammatical and non- 
grammatical sets. These differences in length were 
preserved in the split into novel and old sets.
Selection and construction of the string sets ensured 
that all possible legal transitions of the finite state 
grammar were used at least once (see Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
Instructions. Subjects were told the following:
"In this experiment, you will see several pairs of letter 
strings. One string in each pair has been judged to be 
well-formed by another group of students. Your task is 
to judge which string is well-formed as quickly as 
possible. You should try to judge the pairs of strings 
by focusing on the overall form of each string. When a 
pair of strings is presented, press the button marked 'J' 
if you think that the top string is well-formed. Press 
the button marked 'N' if you think that the bottom string 
is wel1-formed.* (These keys correspond to the keys J and 
N on the IBM PC keyboard.)
The subjects were given no other information about 
the strings and were instructed to begin selecting the 
strings by guessing. They were told that they would
"soon learn to judge which string is well-formed if you 
focus on its overall form". The subjects were instructed 
further that after each response to a pair of strings, 
the string that was well-formed would be highlighted by 
flanking ^asterisks*. They were told to respond within 
one second to each pair, otherwise their response would 
not be recorded, although the well-formed string would 
still be highlighted.
Finally, subjects were told that their accuracy and 
speed would be reported to them after each block of 
trials, for both the immediate block and the one 
preceding it. They were urged to become faster and more 
accurate over each block of trials.
Training. In the center of the computer screen, a 
"plus" sign (+) was displayed for 500 ms in the position 
between the two strings as a preparatory signal for an 
imminent trial. The subjects then saw a pair of letter 
strings for one second, e.g.
MTR
MTQ
Once the subject responded to a string pair by selecting
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either the top or bottom string, the actual well-formed 
string was marked by flanking ^asterisks* for one second. 
If the subject did not respond before the one second
deadline, then the trial was terminated and recorded an a 
non-response. As above, the well-formed string was 
flanked by asterisks once the deadline was exceeded.
Subjects received 10 blocks of 48 trials, where each 
block consisted of the presentation, in random order, o f  
the set of 12 pairs of old strings. This set consisted 
of six grammatical and six non-grammatical strings and 
was presented four times for each training block {see 
Table 1). After each block, the subjects were given 
feedback as to their accuracy and average response time 
for the two preceding blocks. The purpose of this 
feedback was to help the subjects remain motivated 
throughout the task.
Transfer. Prior to the eleventh block, the subjects 
were instructed that the following block of trials would 
no longer involve feedback, neither during the block nor 
after it. We reasoned that the presentation of feedback 
with the novel string pairs might cause subjects to 
revert to an earlier form of deliberative learning rather 
than relying upon their acquired automatic judgment.
The eleventh block of trials presented the 12 novel
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pairs of strings intermixed with the original 12 old 
pairs used in the training phase (see Table 1). Each set 
of string pairs was presented twice, in random order, 
throughout the 48 trials of the block.
Assessment. The subjects were given twenty-four 
assessment blocks, where each block consisted of 3 
training trials of old pairs and a test pair from the set 
of old and novel pairs. The twenty-four test pairs were 
each presented once and in a new random order for each 
subject. Each test pair was presented without feedback 
as to which string was well-formed, and the subject was 
asked to "Write down the part or parts of the string that 
made you think it was well formed at the time of your 
response". The string chosen as "well-formed" and the 
instructions for the report of feature(s) were displayed 
immediately after the subject's response. The 
instructions told the subjects to place the critical 
feature(s) of the string in the blanks of the assessment 
sheet corresponding to the actual position of the 
feature(s) in the string. The assessment sheet consisted 
of seven blanks for each of the twenty-four strings.
Due to incorrect usage of the awareness assessment 
forms, 11 subjects' responses were not used in the 
assessment analysis. Therefore, N ■» 35 for the
assessment block.
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Results
Lgar,aina.-jQl-LJbLg .Dlscrimitation lasfc
Subjects acquired partial knowledge of the finite 
state grammar and were able to discriminate grammatical 
strings from non-grammatical strings at a level higher 
than chance (50%). Across all subjects, proportion of 
correct responses were .60 and .82 (N = 46) in the first 
and last training blocks (blocks 1 and 10), respectively.
A repeated measures within-subject analysis of 
variance with dependent variable of proportion of correct 
responses (PCORR) showed a significant effect for the 
factor of block, £(9, 405) = 39.8, jg = .0001. This 
demonstrates that discrimination learning occurred.
There was also an effect for string size, £(2, 90) =
19.0, £ = .0001; and a significant block * string size 
interaction, £(18, 810) = 2.29, p < .002, showing that 
subjects learned differentially for the three string 
sizes. (See Figure 2.)
Insert Figure 2 about here
Procedural Learning
As expected from the one-second response deadline, 
there was no evidence of a decrease in RT over blocks. A
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repeated measures within-subject analysis of variance 
with dependent variable of RT showed a significant effect 
only for string size, £(2, 90) = 23.20, & = .0001. There 
was no significant effect of block nor of the interaction 
of block * string size. (See Figure 3.)
Insert Figure 3 about here
Cflfit-JCLf.Novel,.SLCiaafi . The transfer block (11) did show
an increase in RT for the responses to the novel strings 
relative to old strings, which indicated that the cost 
criterion for procedural learning was met. The means of 
the RTs for old and novel strings were 677 ms and 713 ms 
(N = 46), respectively. A T-test (2 tailed) showed this 
difference to be significant, 1(44) = 3.81, £ = .0004. 
(See Figure 4.)
insert Figure 4 about here
Increase PCORR Below 1 Second Deadline. The second 
criterion of a significant increase in proportion of 
correct responses (PCORR) was found. As reported above, 
there was a significant effect for the factor of block in 
a repeated measures analysis of variance. This
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increasing amount of learning occurred below a time 
constraint of one second, and such evidence supports the 
interpretation of proceduralization due to the 
improbability that subjects could respond using 
deliberation of rules within this constraint.
Trans fcer.-af ,„L,gaming
Three indices demonstrated in conjunction that there 
was no transfer of the discrimination learning from the 
old strings to the novel strings. At the transfer block 
(11), PCORR of old and novel strings had means of .78 and 
.59 (N  ^ 46), respectively. T~ test (2 tailed) showed 
this difference to be significant, 1 (44) - 6.96, i. = 
.0001. Something had been learned about the old strings 
that does not apply directly to the novel strings. (See 
Figure 5.)
Insert Figure 5 about here
The second index of the specificity of the learning 
is found in the contrast of PCORR of block 1 versus PCORR 
of novel strings in block 11 (transfer), M = .60 and .59, 
respectively. A contrast analysis of variance for PCORR 
block 1 and PCORR block 11-novel resulted in no effect, 
£(1, 45) = .124, £ = .72. Apparently, the subjects
learned the novel strings in a similar fashion to their
l e a r n i n g  o f  t h e  old s t r i n g s  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  t a s k .
The third index for a l a c k  o f  transfer o f  the 
learning was found in the results o f  the contrast of RT 
of b l o c k  1 versus block 11-new. A contrast analysis of 
variance found no significant effect for the above 
contrast, £ (1, 45) = .376, p = .54. This supports 
further the claim that subjects were learning the novel 
strings at block 11 in the same way that they learned the 
old strings at block 1.
These three results indicated that the knowledge of 
the old strings at the end of the task was different than 
the knowledge of the novel strings and the old strings at 
the beginning, and there was no transfer of this learned 
knowledge from the old strings to the novel strings (in 
block 11).
Ralation ■Qi.-fiapQXL&d., Rules la JEerloraracft-,Judgments
At assessment, reported rules of features within 
strings were analyzed using the VALSCORE program in order 
to obtain validity scores for each subject (cf. Dulany, 
Carlson, Dewey, 1984 for original explanation of the 
VALSCORE program). The logic of the VALSCORE program is 
as follows: (a) Subjects learn that certain features of
a string or the whole string signify that it is
grammatical, (b) Subjects select a string as grammatical
based on a feature or the who1e, and report this feature 
on the assessment sheet, (c) The proportion of correct 
responses is computed according to the subjects' 
classification of the string, (d) Validities are computed 
according to the probability that the string is 
grammatical given that the feature is in the string, and 
therefore (e) If subjects report the feature that 
actually determined their selection response, then the 
validities should predict the PCORR without significant 
residual; otherwise either subjects are not aware o f  the 
feature which determined their selection response, or 
subjects did not faithfully report the feature which 
drove their response. For each subject, validity scores; 
and PCORR were calculated for the set of all 24 strings, 
the set of the 12 old strings, and the set of the 12 
novel strings.
After first analyzing the VALSCORE data, there was 
reason to believe that subjects had incorrectly responded 
to the assessment task by placing features which were not 
possible for the string selected (e.g. reporting 'MTQ' 
when the string selected was actually 'MTR'). This type 
of error was attributed to carelessness and distraction 
during the experiment (factors which may be the fault of
the experimenter's choice to run four subjects at once), 
and therefore all of the subjects' responses to the 
assessment task were checked for misreports and 
individual errors were discarded from the analysis. A 
misreporb consisted of a subject reporting a feature 
which was not found in the string which had been chosen 
as grammatical; such a response violates the instructions 
of the assessment form since the chosen string was the 
only string presented for the assessment. Overall, less 
than ten percent of responses were discarded from the 
analysis.
Correlations of validity with PCORR resulted in the 
following; for the set of 24, £ = .449; for the set of 
12 old, £ = .607; and for the set of 12 novel, £ = .600. 
(See Figures 6, 7, 8.)
Insert Figures 6, 7, 8 about here
T-tests (2 tailed) of the mean validities and moan 
PCORRs for each set resulted in 1(34) = 3.64, £ * .0009, 
for the set of 24; £.(34) = 3.29, £ = .0023, for the set 
of 12 old; £(34) = 1.99, £ * .0545, fcr the set of 12 
novel.
These two sets of analysis revealed that the
prediction of the PCORR by validities was underachieved 
in both the total set of strings and the old strings 
alone, while the validities of the novel strings 
underpredict their PCORR by marginal significance.
The graphs of the residuals for the prediction of 
PCORR by validities show that for both the old and novel 
sets of strings the modal residual is zero. Furthermore, 
the distributions of residuals are skewed such that only 
a small number of subjects are responsible for the 
deviation away from a balanced distribution around the 
modal value of zero. (See Figures 9, 10, 11.)
Insert Figures 9, 10, 11 about here
Since the distributions of residuals have one of the 
characteristics expected for the prediction of PCORR by 
validities without significant residual, namely the modal 
value of zero, it is important to consider what the t- 
test group differences truly signify. The t-test can 
produce a group difference in means when there are only a 
few individual subjects responsible for the results of 
underprediction. Therefore, the skewedness of the 
distributions calls for an analysis of individual 
residuals to determine the number of subjects who
actually demonstrate significant underprediction.
The results of the individual analyses showed that 
only two subjects obtained significant residual with 
underprediction. Both subjects' residuals were highly 
significant (p < .01) only for the set of old strings. 
None were significant for the novel strings (level .05). 
For the total set of strings, only three subjects* 
residuals were significant (p < .05). This means that, 
from the set of all 35 subjects, 33 of them demonstrated 
the prediction of PCORR by their validities without 
significantresidual for the set of old strings; and all 
of the subjects showed prediction without significant 
residual for the set of novel strings.
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Discussion
There were two goals of this experiment: (1) achieve 
procedural learning within a finite state grammar task, 
and (2) determine whether the knowledge which drove the 
subjects' responses was consciously or unconsciously 
represented. The first goal has been met with the 
evidence of a cost in RT with the presentation of novel 
strings and of the significant increase in proportion of 
correct responses while under a response deadline of one 
second. The issue of conscious or unconscious learning 
is decided by the following discussion of the awareness 
assessment, where it is argued that the procedural 
learning is driven by evocative conscious contents.
The achievement of procedural learning is found in 
two measures of analysis. One is the criterion of cost 
when novelty is introduced, revealed by the significant 
difference of RT for old and novel strings in the 
transfer block. The means of the RTs for old and novel 
strings were significantly different, with old having a 
lower value. The second piece of evidence for procedural 
learning is based on the highly significant change in 
proportion of correct responses over blocks when this 
occurs within time constraints of less than 730 ms. In 
order for subjects to be responding this quickly while
achieving such marked improvement over trials, there 
would need to be either progress toward proceduralization 
from deliberate application of abstract rules or an 
immediate automatic learning of the task that would seem 
to require unconscious implicit learning (cf. Lewicki et 
al., 1988; Reber, 1989).
Before turning to the discussion of awareness, there 
is an interesting aspect of Dulany's alternative theory 
of implicit learning which relates to the lack of 
transfer of learning found in the results of this 
experiment.
Dulany's (1984, 1991) theoretical characterization 
of implicit processes as being evocative and automatic 
episodes which are driven by conscious contents entails 
the following predictions for transfer effects of 
learning. In general, discriminative learning tasks are 
considered to be tasks which require deliberation on the 
part of the subject. For this experiment, my principle 
assumption is that the task initially does require 
deliberation in order to choose the grammatical string of 
the pair. The goal of the task is to induce or compel 
the subjects to use less and less deliberation until the 
responses are automatic, and the proportion of correct 
responses increases due to the speed of the evocative
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process. When the feature 'MT' appears, a sense of 
grammatical pops to the subject's mind, and the subject 
chooses that string as grammatical. One no longer needs 
to deliberately remember a rule to apply to the choice, 
nor to remember a specific instance in the past. Whan 
the subjects reach the transfer block, it has been shown 
that procedural learning has been acquired, and then 
there should be no transfer of learning because the
aublficls .hq, longer, .deliberate, upon l,he choice, „but rather 
hayg.an SYsted.sense of.the answer 'qrammatic >1*. if the
subjects did still deliberate upon the choice, then those 
abstract rules (in the strict sense of the word) could be 
applied to the novel strings as easily as to the familiar 
old strings (with a possible exception that the novelty 
might shock or jar the subject, which in any case should 
not produce significant effects of non-transference).
The case in which the subjects do not deliberate, but 
have an evoked knowledge of the grammatical string, 
should not allow transfer of learning to the novel 
strings simply because their knowledge is specific to the 
feature(s) of that particular string. It is only in the 
case that the novel strings share the grammatical 
feature(s) of old grammatical strings that there should 
be transfer of learning effects. Hence, for Dulany's
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concept of implicit learning, transfer of learning should 
appear strongly only when there is great overlap of 
features for automatized or nearly automatized responses1.
I argue that the lack of transference of learning 
from the old strings to the novel strings supports the 
interpretation that procedural learning has been 
achieved. This lack of transfer is evident in the 
results. There it was seen that the proportion of 
correct responses was significantly different for novel 
strings compared to the old strings in the transfer 
block, but was not significantly different for those 
novel strings to the old strings of block 1.
This experiment was designed to produce procedural 
learning within a finite state grammar discrimination 
task. These results were achieved, and the analysis of 
the awareness assessments will decide the theoretically 
crucial question: Do proceduralized learning tasks
function without the subject's conscious awareness of the 
contents which drive the responses?
The analysis of individual subjects' residuals shows 
that the only a few subjects are responsible for the skew 
of the residuals distributions. Furthermore, the modal 
value of both distributions (old and novel strings) is 
zero, and the curve is nearly symmetrical except for the
influence of those few subjects. From these results 
there are two possible interpretations of the data: (1)
The t-tests and skew of the residuals distributions 
reveal a general process of learning which is 
inaccessible to consciousness; or (2) the t-tests and 
skew of the distributions is the result of experimental 
error, such as the failure of subjects to respond 
carefully to the assessment due to the presence of 
multiple subjects.
The second interpretation is superior due to the 
facts that the distributions are nearly symmetrical 
around a mode of zero, as opposed to showing an overall 
phase shift toward underprediction (meaning a general 
tendency for reports to fail to correspond to 
performance). But there is still a question as to the 
difference between the t-tests and skew of residuals 
distributions for old versus novel strings. Novel 
strings show less skew in their distribution and have no 
individual cases of significant underprediction. What 
feature of the novel strings would allow for closer 
prediction, while excluding the old strings? The answer 
for this is found in the relation of the assessment's 
instructions with the type of knowledge which 
characterizes the learning of the old and novel strings.
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In the results concerning the nature of the 
knowledge of the strings, it was seen that whatever was 
learned about the old strings did not transfer to the 
novel strings in any degree. This leads one to consider 
if the proceduralization of the responses to the old 
strings affected the representation of those strings. It 
seems likely that subjects, after seeing the same 12 
pairs of old strings for 480 trials, begin to recognize 
the whole string, and thus the presensetation of those 
strings holistically evokes a sense of 'grammatical'.
This is different from the learning of the novtil strings 
at block 11, where it is likely that subjects notice 
particular features of those strings which correspond to 
features in the old strings. This interpretation would 
predict that the proportion of correct responses would 
decrease for the novel strings, since the match of 
features from old to novel would be merely partial. The 
results showed such a decrease.
The conflict of this dichotomy of representation, 
holistic and featuristic, becomes important for the 
VALSCORE results when contrasted with the instructions of 
the assessment. The awareness assessment asked subjects 
to “Write down the part or parts of the string that made 
you think it was well formed at the time of your
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response". This emphasis on features of strings, without 
mentioning the option of reporting the entire string, 
would lead subjects to report arbitrary features of the 
old strings when it was actually the whole string which 
evoked the thought 'grammatical1. This would not pose as 
great a problem for the novel strings since the subjects 
are already attuned to features of the strings.
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Conclusion
The achievement of procedural learning in a finite 
state grammar task has been met. with the evidence of a 
cost in RT w i t h  the presentation of novel strings and of 
the s i g n i f i c a n t  increase in proportion of correct 
r e s p o n s e s  w h i l e  und«r a response deadline of one second. 
The m a j o r  issue concerns the accessibility of the task 
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  c o n s c i o u s  vs. unconscious.
For  two reasons, the results of the awareness 
assessment should be viewed as supporting the claim that 
conscious contents are driving the performance of the 
subjects. The proceduralization of the old strings 
brought about a change in representation of the knowledge 
acquired during the task, and the assessment of awareness 
was not completely attuned to this change. . erefore, 
the difference in prediction of proportion of correct 
responses by the subjects' validities (for novel vs. old 
strings) is due to the assessment procedure rather than 
the subjects' cognitive processing, and the individual 
prediction without significant residual for 33 of 35 
subjects supports the view that evocative conscious 
contents are responsible for th* learning effects.
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Footnotes
imagine an example of automatized response that is 
familiar to many people, driving an automobile. For most 
adults, che skill of driving is automatic in many ways; 
many decisions and deliberations are no longer necessary 
although they were when you first learned to drive. It 
may seem against my argument to point out that we are all 
capable of entering several different kinds of autos and 
drive as easily as always. Doesn't this show transfer of 
knowledge without deliberation? Yes it does. What it 
doesn't show is transfer of knowledge when the features 
of the stimulus environment have changed to a significant 
degree. Imagine trying to drive an auto whose interior 
is significantly different from our common exemplar. 
Perhaps the steering mechanism (a shared feature) is 
operated by applying pressure to a head-rest cushion.
Now could you drive with ease? I think not. A future 
experiment should investigate the parameters which define 
similarity of features and the transfer of automatized 
knowledge.
T a b l e  1
OLD STRING PAIRS NOVEL STRING PAIRS
MTR / MTQ * MQT * / MQR
QXM * / MTR MQR / QXR *
MTQ * / MXQ QMR / MQT *
MXQ / QXM * QXR * / QMR
MTXRX / MTQRX * MQRXR * / MQMXR
QXTQT * / MTXRX MQMXR / QXQRX *
MTQRX * / QXTMT QXQRX * / QMQRX
QXTMT / QXTQT * QMQRX / MQRXR *
QXQRXRM * / MQXRXRM QXTQRXM * / MXTQRXM
MQXRXRM / MQRXTQT * MXTQRXM / MTQRXQT *
MXRXTQT / QXQRXRM * MQXRQTM / QXTQRXM *
MQRXTQT * / MXRXTQT MTQRXQT * / MQXRQTM
(* = grammatical, left = top position, right = bottom 
position)
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1. Finite state grammar,
2. Proportion Correct Responses by Blocks, three string
sizes.
3. Reaction time by Blocks, three string sizes.
4. Reaction time by Blocks, Novel Strings vs. Old Strings
in block 11.
5. Proportion Correct Responses by Blocks, Novel Strings
vs. Old Strings in block 11.
6. Correlation of PCORR and Validities. All strings.
7. Correlation of PCORR and Validities. Old strings.
8. Correlation of PCORR and Validities. Novel strings.
9. Distribution of residuals. All strings.
10. Distribution of residuals. Old strings.
11. Distribution of residuals. Novel strings.
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